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Abstract: Over the last 20 years, the success of Japanese manufacturing firms has brought
renewed attention to the importance of cost reduction on existing products as a source of
productivity growth. This paper uses survey data and field interviews from the auto supply
industry to explore the determinants of average-cost reduction for a sample of 171 plants in the
United States and Canada between 1988 and 1992. The main result is that the determinants of
cost reduction differ markedly between firms which had employee involvement programs in 1988
and firms that did not. The two groups of firms achieved equal amounts of cost reduction. but did
so in very different ways. Firms with employee involvement saw their costs fall more if they also
had “voice” relationships with customers and workers. Firms without such involvement gained no
cost-reduction benefit fkom these programs; instead, their cost reduction success was largely a
fi.mction of increases in volume. These results provide support for Milgrom and Roberts’s concept
that certain production practices exhibit compiementarity.
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IL Introduction
In the 1960s, Samuel Hollander found that DuPont’s incremental improvements to its
production process for rayon had led to consistent decreases in standard costs of almost four
percent per year for two decades. This “minor technical change” accounted for more than 70?4 of
all cost reduction achieved by DuPont’s operations during that time (Hollander. 1965, pp. 192-6)
Despite the magnitude of this result, economists in recent years have neglected the study of the
determinants of incremental improvements. *
In manufacturing, by contrast, incremental improvement has been seen as a key source of
competitive advantage for firms. Japanese automakers for decades have required their suppliers
to reduce their costs annually by several percent--in nominal terms (Okano, 1994). Recently US
automakers have adopted the idea that the prices of the components they buy from suppliers
should go down every year (not up), and they have adopted a Japanese word (kaixn or
‘[continuous improvement”) to describe how suppliers should achieve this goal. (Ford for example
announced in 1996 that suppliers should reduce costs by So/Oper year through the year 2000.
(Konet, 1996))
This paper uses data from the automotive supply indust~ to examine the sources and
determinants of cost reduction. Of course cost reduction is not the only way to maximize profits.
Mso, cost reduction is not always due to productivity improvement. because cost reduction can
be achieved by obtaining lower factor prices. However, cost reduction on an existing product has
been a principal focus of many firms in the auto industry. Because the auto industry has in the US
‘Most of the large literature on the learning curve is an attempt to measure its effects
rather than determine its causes. For a survey, see Dutton, Thomas, and Butler (1984). For an
exception, see Adler and Clark (199 1).
2been attheforefront ofattempts toadopt Japanese practices such askaizen, anunderstandingof
this industry may well provide broader lessons. In addition, US suppliers are participants (willing
or not) in a natural experiment, as General >lotors aggressively seeks cost reduction by setting up
a global competitive market, while Ford and Chrysler are trying to attain the same goal by making
long-term commitments to a few firms (Helper, 1994; Dyer, 1996).
The next section of the paper uses field research to describe two approaches to cost
reduction. Section 3 describes the survey data used to test the determinants of cost reduction
Section 4 presents hypotheses, and section 5 presents results from estimating this model for the
period 1988-1992. Section 6 provides discussion, and section 7 concludes.
The focus of this paper is on the how the nature of incentives affects agents’ willingness to
participate in cost reduction activities, In contrast, a series of excellent case studies on the
mechanisms by which cost reduction and process improvement can be achieved has been
produced by Marcie Tyrez and by John Paul MacDuffie (forthcoming). These papers focus on
issues of implementation, such as achieving the right balance between isolating improvement
activities from day-to-day production pressures and removing a sense of urgency
Data for this paper come flom two sources. The first is interviews with a variety of
participants in the automobile industry over the past 12 years; these interviews were conducted as
part of ongoing research on how supplien’customer relations affect performance in the Us auto
industry. The second source is two surveys I conducted of managers at auto supply firms in 1993.
H. Types of Approaches to Cost Reduction
A. The traditional approach
~See for example Tyre, 199 1; von Hippel and Tyre; Tyre and Oriikowski
3The traditional recipe for reducing costs in American business has been based on 1)
emphasis on adopting high-fixed cost production processes which can be profitable only if
capacity utilization is kept high, and 2) using arms’ -length markets for inputs, For much of [his
century, this strategy proved extremely successfld in both reducing costs and maintaining high
pro fits.3
This strategy is quite common among US auto suppliers. Below are two examples from
my field research.4 The first is a firm located in Wellington, Ohio, A large part of this firm’s
operation involves putting anti-corrosion and other types of coatings onto fasteners used in
automotive engines. Many of the parts require that a thin strip of coating be placed in a precise
location, The firm’s competitive advantage is that it has figured out how to use tumblers (big
.
botvls of parts which are jiggled by an electric motor underneath) to orient the small pafls so that
the coating can be applied by machine rather than by hand. The operators’ job is to watch the
parts coming out of the machine, to remove any that are defective, and to call a skilled
maintenance worker if the machine stops running. In practice, the operator can’t check evety part.
because the parts come offofthe machine very quickly (and also the work quickly induces
boredom, as could readily be obsetved on the operators’ faces). If quality is very important (as in
‘On the achievement of economies of scale and of throughput, see Chandler ( 1977), On
use of arms’ -length input markets for labor, see Lazonick (1989); for parts supply, see Helper
(199 1). For a critique of these practices, see Piore and Sahel ( 1984).
4 This paper discusses production by automotive parts suppliers, not automotive
assemblers. Parts suppliers typically make a large variety of parts. Thus, they have been slow to
adopt a key tenetof’ Fordist’ practice, which is to create an assembly line where the product
flows from one station to another one unit at a time, rather than grouping machines by fimtction
and having them produce in batches. Thus while both assemblers and parts makers seek
economies of scale, parts makers have traditionally produced in large batches, carrying a lot of
work-in-process inventory and having long throughput times.
4an airbag part, for example), extra inspectors are added (which of course adds to the cost)
The operators are paid $8 per hour, about the average for the area; they receive no
training (other than watching someone else do the job for a brief time), They are not expected to
contribute suggestions for improvement, and typically do not stay more than a year or two s
The main source of reduced costs was the result of engineers figuring out how to
automate the coating of ever trickier pafls. In one case we observed, engineers were trying to
figure out how to automate the coating of a part which was almost, but not quite, symmetric
They were working on special feeder trays, and talking about machine vision systems, but had not
asked the customer if it would be possible to change the design of the part to make it easier to
orient. When asked why they hadn’t discussed the matter with the customer, they said they didn’t
think the customer would be interested, because other coaters wouldn’t have the same process
(In most cases. the coating firm doesn’t receive any contracts for its work; when it receives a
batch of parts from a customer, there is no guarantee that the customer will send another one )
Purchasing a machine vision system would have been a substantial addition to the firm’s fixed
costs. so it would increase the firm’s breakeven point and the extent to which its cost finction is
characterized by economies of scale. In contrast, a firm having the ‘voice’ relationship with its
customer discussed below might have been able to solve the problem more cheaply, by discussing
whether the part could be redesigned to fit with the existing process
A second example is a firm which made printed circuit boards for the auto industry. This
firm brought in a consulting firm to facilitate a comprehensive review of their manufacturing
jAt the time of my visit in July 1996, some of these features were in the process of being
changed. For example, management was introducing a system of individual evaluation of workers.
ill if l~ich points were given for number of jobs learned and suggestions made.
5operations, Following an established, proprietary methodology developed about ten years ago, the
consulting firm established a goal of reducing “compressible” costs (those the plant had some
control over) by 40°/0. (The 40°/0 goal is a standard one for this process; in this case it worked out
to be a reduction of about 15°/0of average total cost over an 18-month period (six months for
planning a list of improvements and I year for implementation)).
The consultants worked with a team of engineers and supervisors from the plant to rethink
the entire process. To overcome any resistance to change, the consultants also set up a committee
of higher-level managers within the company to challenge those who said it couldn’t be done ‘(.A
key part of the process is fear”, said one of the consultants involved in the process. “Everybody
will know which guy didn’t get his 40°/0. Who do you think will get promoted, and who will get
laid off? That fear is key to getting people to stop protecting each other, ” The firm’s customers
\\ere not involved in this cost reduction effort,
The project is well on its way to achieving its goal. The key was a change in the way the
boards were assembled. In the original process, a shoti screw was inserted into the board, the
board was then turned over, and another short screw was inserted. This process had a cycle time
of 24 seconds, The team came up with a new method, in which a single long screw was inserted,
eliminating the need for flipping the board over. The cycle time was reduced to 18 seconds; since
this was the bottleneck, the output per hour of the entire process also increased by one-third. This
meant that machines and workers in other stages of the process could be utilized at a higher
capacity, and so eliminated the need for an entire third shift, saving millions of dollars per year.
This idea came from a shifi supewisor in conjunction with some engineers.
These firms illustrate the key features of what I’ve called the “traditional” production
system. Both firms aimed to a large extent to keep their machines running at all times, to spread
their fixed costs over many units.b Because of fear of dependence. relationships with both
workers and customers were arm’s length; little commitment was received from customers,
little was offered to workers. In fact, as the consultant’s quote indicates, commitments to
and
workers were seen as inimical to cost reduction, since they would make it difficult to lay off
workers freed up by the improvement process. (As a consequence, participation of workers in
generating ideas for such improvements was minimal. ) The firms received little commitment from
their customers, who worried that making a commitment to an input provider left them vulnerable
to a costly ‘hold-up’, due to their high fixed costs (Helper and Levine. 1992).
This traditional practice has come under heavy criticism in the !ast 15 years 7. These critics
argued that because the automated equipment is only profitable if its large fixed costs can be
spread over many identical units, companies were led to ignore customer preferences for variety
and quality in their quest to “get the metal out the door”. Further, in their desire to avoid
bSuch is the power of this logic that the rule is observed even at plants like the fastener
operation described above, where equipment costs are less than 10°/0of total costs. According to
management. workers at this plant could stop the line, but rarely did. What we observed in the
plant was that when worker found defects, they threw them away, and made no attempt to
determine the cause of the problem. In contrast, in the voice system, a worker would stop
production until the cause of the problem had been determined and corrected.
An extreme (though not uncommon at the time) observance of the rule that the line should
not be stopped was experienced by Michael Smitka, now an economist at Washington and Lee
University, who was a summer employee in a Chrysler parts plant in the 1970s. Early one day one
of the machines went out of alignment, and started punching holes in the wrong place. It
happened that the plant manager and his assistant were out of the plant that day. Since they were
the only two people with the authority to stop the line, everyone (several hundred employees) had
to continue working even though they knew everything they produced
would have to be scrapped.
‘Two books that were particularly influential in the automotive
(1984) and Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990).
for the next eight hours
industry were Schonberger
7dependence, firms cut themselves off from valuable sources of new ideas from customers,
suppliers, and workers.8
B. The bbite Approach
Instead of following the traditional approach, these critics suggest, firms should adopt
what following Hirschman ( 1970) could be called a “voice” approach. That is, when a problem
such as high cost or low quaiity arises, firms t~ to resolve the problem by communicating with
suppliers and workers, rather than exiting from them. These relationships have been shown to lead
to significant performance improvements in areas such as product development productivity and
lead time (Clark, 1989; Dyer, forthcoming), product quality (Dyer, forthcoming), and inventory
levels (Lieberman, Helper, and Demeester, 1995).
However, these suggestions may be based on proprietary information. and achieving the
high levels of information flow characteristic of these participative arrangements requires high
levels of relationship-specific investment by both sides.9 A supplier will not make such
‘Despite these criticisms, many automotive suppliers. including General Motors’ parts-
making divisions, continue to emphasize volume increases as the main source of cost reduction
“The only way to really get your costs in line is to take advantage of global volume
opportunities, ” said GM Chairman Jack Smith. In a 2 1/2 tabloid-page article in Aufornofive ,Vew.s
about GM’s plans to cut costs, the only other initiative mentioned was a reduction in product
variety, which again reduces average cost by spreading (given) fixed costs over more units. GM’s
plan did not include establishing closer relations between its parts plants and its assembly plants to
generate cost-saving ideas, or similar discussions with workers. GM lost $1.2 billion last year due
to strikes by its workers, mostly at parts plants where GM wanted to reduce costs by outsourcing
work to lower-wage firms (Child, 1997, p,25; Taylor, 1997, p.96).
9Even if the skills are generally applicable ex ante, they may still be what Williamson calls
“dedicated assets”, which are “discrete additions to generalized capacity which would not be put
in place but for the prospect of selling a large amount of product to a particular customer.
Premature termination of the contract by the buyer would leave the supplier with a large overhang
of capacity that could be disposed of only at distress prices. ” (1985, p. 194)
8investments without some assurance that it will continue to have the business long enough to earn
a reasonable return. In addition. intensive communication over the course of a long-term
relationship means that the parties come to understand each other’s products and processes verv
well, leading to a high cost of switching business partners. Thus, a voice relationship with
suppliers reduces the customer’s bargaining power (Helper and Levine, 1992).
The suppliers have been reluctant to offer commitments to their work forces for the same
reasons
without
that their customers (the Big Three automakers) have wanted to maintain flexibility }“et
such guarantees, workers may be unwilling to actively participate in making suggestions.
particularly when it may make the suggestor’s continued services unnecessary (Parkin, 1996,
Parkin and Helper, 1995).
An example of a firm which is struggling to adopt a voice approach to production is the
Industrial Strainer Corporation, an 80-employee firm located in Plymouth, Michigan. The firm
designs, produces and assembles stamped parts for the automotive industry. The firm was
founded in 1959, when survival in the auto industty was based on ability to be the low bidder in
stamping simple patis to the automakers’ blueprints. Because of the ever-present threat of loss of
business. it was important to keep overhead (such as engineers) low. When the automakers”
strategies changed in the 1980s, the firm managed to survive by investing in more design
capability, including a 3-D CAD (Computer-Aided Design) system in 1990. (The firm’s owners
were willing to devote a substantial proportion of retained earnings to the project due to contracts
from Ford which lasted the life of the car model. ) Eighty percent of the firm’s business was with
9Ford in 1996, and half of that was on just one product, an oil separator for the EscortlO.
In 1994, Ford made a big push to teach its suppliers, including Industrial Strainer, kaizen
techniques. The process involved analyzing the workload of each operator, and brainstorming
ways to eliminate waste (such as time spent walking between machines). and better balance the
workload (so one operator was not idle while others worked), AII example of a successful kazx}l
was on the finishing process of the previous generation of Escort oil separators (the 22080 part),
Nine employees from different areas of the company (including the chief steward of the UAW
local, and the quality engineer) worked for four days on the cross timctional kai:en team. On the
first two days, two Ford engineers taught a continuous improvement class in Industrial Strainer’s
conference room. The team spent the next two days improving their processes under the
guidance of the Ford engineers. The operators made important contributions to the process, For
example, one idea for moving the machines closer together was to turn the line 90°; However, the
forklifl driver on the team pointed out that this would partially block an aisle and create problems
for forklift traffic. Another operator suggested that one of the workers on the oil separator line
had enough time to do a job (placing a cap on a grommet) which had been done as a separate
process; her suggestion thus both increased productivity and reduced inventory, since the
subassemblies were not created until they were needed.
By the end of the week the number of employees required to do the process had been
reduced from four to three. The main sources of improvement were 1) moving machines into a
U-shape so that an employee could work on a second machine while waiting for the first to
‘“Oil separators decrease the amount of oil that an engine bums by separating it from other
gasses emitted by the engine and recirculating the oil back into the engine.
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complete its task, and 2) equalizing the time required to do each job (better line balance).
A need identified during the kaizen process and addressed a few weeks later was for
ergonomic improvements. (An expert in this area from the UAW national ollice provided
specialized expertise ofien unavailable to a small firm; “she was wondefil--we never could have
done this without her, “ said the manufacturing vice president. ) The shop had always used large.
cardboard packing crates that were heavy and diflicult to move. Storage design meant employees
had to reach over their heads to load parts into the crates. The crates weren’t meeting customer
needs either because they were troublesome to empty and created a large amount of cardboard
waste, After a kaizen activity, Industrial Strainer switched to returnable crates made from
corrugated plastic that are smaller, lighter, and easier to handle. Now. there are also new tables
that raise, lower, and rotate to prevent employees from bending and stretching when handling
parts. The benefits of the investment are increased productivity, reduced injuries (which saves
money), and reduced packaging costs for both Industrial Strainer and Ford. Quality also
improved, because of reduced damage to parts while they were sitting in inventory.
The kaizen process cost 36 person-days of effoti and 2 Iifl tables (costing at most $8000).
and yielded savings of one employee for one year (when the part was redesigned) --about $30,000,
Despite the clear payoff to the group improvement efforts, it was hard for management to find the
time to spare engineers from routine production pressures. *1For example, at the time of my first
visit to the firm in May 1996, they were changing over to make a slightly redesigned oil separator
1lAS the shop steward put it, “1 wish continuous improvement around here were really
continuous. Instead, it just seems to fizzle. ”
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for the 1997 model Escortl~. They were using 10 people to do the assembly, rather than the four
that had been assumed when they quoted their price to Ford. (From watching the process it
seemed that two of the extra people were not really necessary even for the current layout of the
process. Instead, their presence was probably due to management’s desire not to lay anyone off,
even though the firm had just lost a large order for Ford’s F-150 truck (the pati had been
designed out of the new model).) I was told that they had named a team to work on the new oil
separator, but the team had still not met four months later.
In contrast to the workers at the coating plant described above, Industrial Strainer
employees felt that the company had made a commitment to them. The average operator at
Industrial Strainer had 19.5 years of seniority, and was paid about $12 per hour, slightly above the
prevailing wage for the area. Because of their long tenure, and extensive job rotation, the workers
were familiar with their jobs, and understood how the processes fit together. 13In addition to the
group improvement processes, of which there have been 3 since 1994. any employee can make
suggestions by filling out a form which is posted on a wall in the plant. Last year there were
lzThe fact that the kaizen team’s application of the kaizen principles depends crucially on
the detailed design of the product (even a slight change in product specifications such as the one
described above led to big changes in the assembly process) and on the machinery which the firm
already has in place suggests that this type of technical change is not non-rival in any meaningtid
sense, Even if the ‘recipe for mixing inputs together” (Romer, 1990) could be easily shared
(making the kaizen results non-excludable as well), who would be interested? Even a rival making
the same product would be using different equipment or have a different configuration of factory
tloor space available. It seems to me that the market failure involved in this sort of technical
change does not have to do with the nature of the output (“the recipe”) but rather the
relationship-specific investments necessary to generate the recipe. (On the concept of relationship-
specific investments and skills, see Asanuma ( 1989). )
13Getting would-be improvers (whether they are operators or engineers) to understand in
detail how each job tits with the others in a line is key to a successful process (MacDuflie,
forthcoming; von Hippel and Tyre; Aoki, 1990, p. 11).
IQ
about 170 cost-saving suggestions submitted by employees, even though there were no special
rewards for employees who did so.
Key to the workers’ active participation in the activities described above was
management’s commitment that no one would be laid off as a result of productivity improvement
Even though layoffs had been quite rare in the past. the union shop steward reported that there
had been “a lot of fear” in the plant when the idea of continuous improvement was first presented.
she had spent a great deal of time obtaining assurances from management and communicating
them to her members. Thus, Ford’s intervention helped Industrial Strainer’s human resource
policies become complementary: the suggestion program and the labor-management committee
were more effective in eliciting workers’ ideas because they were accompanied by safeguards of a
no-layoff for productivity pledge and an el%ciency wage. 14
Industrial Strainer had long had paternalistic wage and layoff policies. However.
employees weren’t used to having much of a say in production decisions+ so the workers’
experience and good will went largely untapped. Ford’s involvement
key to changing this, because the automaker’s training program both
with Industrial Strainer was
showed the company how to
organize empioyee involvement and forced the company to concentrate on improvement activities
which otherwise always seemed to get pushed aside by pressures for immediate production. tj On
the other had, Ford’s training program would not have been so successful had workers not had
the skill or inclination to participate. Thus, we see evidence of complementarily (Milgrom and
l%ee Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (forthcoming) for a discussion of complementarily
in human resource practices.
lSOn the importance of some degree of insulation from production pressures of people
doing incremental improvements, see Tyre ( 199 1).
13
Roberts (1992)): worker voice and supplier voice are more effective when used together ‘6
These improvement processes also had the impact of making the firm’s breakeven point
lower than that of a firm making similar products using a traditional production process. U-shaped
lines and cross-trained workers meant the firm could vary labor input for a particular product
according to demand. (For example, if demand for the oil separator were to fall, one person could
assemble the whole part herself)
In addition, the firm gained access to expertise without having to make a lumpy
investment in specialists. That is, the cost reduction process at Industrial Strainer depended
heavily on voice relations with its workers and its principal customer. These relationships gave
parties with many different types of experience with the product the incentive and the capability
make suggestions for improvement, rather than turning the problem over to specialists (.Aoki,
to
1990). Because these programs improve quality by improving the process (rather than by adding
inspectors) there is not necessarily a cost-quality tradeoff.
C. Discltssiotl
From the above discussion, it appears that firms in the US auto parts sector have used two
different models of cost reduction in the last decade: the traditional approach and the voice
approach. These models h@light different factors as important for good performance. To clari@
this, it is perhaps useild to put these approaches in the context of cost fi.mctions. The traditional
approach implies:
1) Ac = AC(Q, H(D, ~,
‘6See Helper and Levine ( 1992) for other examples of complementarily between supplier
and worker participation: benefits of a long chain of communication, more effective just-in-time
production. and economies of joint implementation of the two sets of policies.
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where AC is average cost per non-defective part, Q is quantity of output, W is a vector of factor
costs. D is the defect rate, and T controls for the technology used to make the product. Totally
differentiating, we find the change in average cost with respect to time, t
~) &<”~~ = /4(” ’(Q)*@~[ – AC’~*dWdt – A(””(~)*@ ~{ – ,-j(’’fTj*~TC][
I hypothesize that in the traditional model AC’(Q) <0 for some pan of its range, AC’(W) z O.
and AC’(D) >0 ( there is a quality-cost tradeoff). I interpret the last term of(2) as the degree of
technological opportunity for cost reduction afforded by the product. If the technology is ve~
mature, then it will be more difficult to think of cost-reducing modifications to the production
process that haven’t already been tried
In contrast, the voice model can be written as follows:
3) AC=A [-(W,j17(~, /7 ~, T),
where /T~ indicates the cumulative amount of voice which has been used with factor I. which is a
finction of I’s cumulative wage, and of the amount of information which has been exchanged by
the parties,’7 Totally differentiating gives:
4) cL4C(it= AC ‘~ * dWdt -AC ‘(jIn)* jl’ ‘(]W) W -
AC ‘(jT’)* jT” ‘(J?’)P-AC ‘(~ “dT dt
As in the traditional model technological opportunity for cost reduction should continue to affect
opportunities for cost reduction, and the direct effect of an increase in factor prices should still be
to increase costs. However, as discussed above, the average cost of producing a product is not
“By ]T’, I mean the integral from t= 1 to the current period;/W has a similar
interpretation. The rationale for this formulation that average cost is a fbnction of cumulative
voice is that parties learn from each other over time, and gain trust in each other. Therefore, even
a constant level of communication per year between the parties will produce a change in costs
over time.
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particularly dependent the quantity produced of that product18. Also, moderate increase in the
factor price might redwv costs by improving the use of voice in the relationship. (This could be
done either by increasing the current price, or the total expected revenue stream by increasing
commitment to suppliers or workers. ) As shown in the Industrial Strainer case, the rationale
would be both that the increased expected payment leads to both more investment (as in the CAD
purchase made possible by the long-term contract with Ford), and more loyalty (as in a gift
exchange (Akerlof 1982)). As discussed above, in the voice model there is no longer a systematic
relationship between quality and cost.
[11. Data
The data come from two surveys of automotive suppliers I conducted in spring and
summer 1993.19 The first survey was sent to the divisional director of sales and marketing at
automotive suppliers in the United States and Canada. ‘oThe focus of this suwey was information
about relationships with customers, and product characteristics. The second survey was sent to
plant managers, and asked about operations policies and relationships with workers. Because
many companies supply their customers with several different types of products, and their
relationships with their customers differ by product, respondents were asked to answer the
18[n many cases, economies of scale will continue to be present in some form even in
voice-oriented firms. (Commitments to suppliers and workers may increase a firm’s fixed costs.
although these commitments also increase the firm’s flexibility in allocating these inputs to
different products.) However, to sharpen the difference between the two models of cost
reduction, 1 will leave quantity out of the voice model.
“Similar surveys were carried out in Europe by Mari Sako of the London School of
Economics; she also carried out the sales manager survey in Japan.
~OThesurvey was sent to the divisional business manager or director of strategic planning
in the case of components divisions of vehic!e manufacturers.
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questionnaire for their most important customer regarding one product which was typical of their
company’s output and with which they were familiar
Many of the questions were taken from an earlier survey undertaken by Helper in the
United States in 1989 and a short questionnaire on trust and opportunism administered by Sako in
the electronics industry in Japan and Britain in 1988-9 In addition, questionnaires were piloted at
a handtld of supplier companies in the USA and Japan during 1992. As a result, improvements
were made to the clarity of questions and the ease of answering them. Much attention was paid
to the phrasing of questions in a vocabulary familiar to managers, and to the consistency of
meaning in the English and Japanese languages. For instance we asked several people to translate
some questions from English to Japanese and others to translate them back from Japanese into
English. The process of piloting and revision took around nine months.zl
The sample chosen for the North American questionnaire was every automotive supplier
and automaker component division named in the Elm Guide to A utomotiw Sourcitlg (available
from Elm, Inc. in East Lansing, Michigan). This guide lists the major first-tier suppliers (both
domestic and foreign-owned) to manufacturers of cars and light trucks in the United States and
Canada. Each respondent who hadn’t yet responded to the survey received three mailings over
the course of 2 1/2 months.
The responses were far above the norm for business surveys. The response rate was 55%
for the sales manager survey, and 30’?Aofor the plant manager survey.
~lAlthough English-language surveys were sent to Japanese-owned suppliers in the United
States, we believe that this process helped us to use language that was understood consistently by
both US and Japanese managers. (About 1/3 of the sutweys from these Japanese “transplants”
were filled out by people with Japanese names. )
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of firm
The respondents to each survey are quite representative of the population in terms of size
and location, as compared with data from the Elm Guide and from County Business
Patterns for SICS 3714 (automotive parts) and 3496 (automotive stampings) However, vertically
integrated business units of the automakers were under-represented (The results reported belo~i
do not change if the sample is restricted to financially-independent firms. )
The analysis in this paper required data from firms which answered both the plant manager
and the marketing director survey; 171 business units provided this complete data. This subsample
does not differ from the fi.dl samples on the variables used in the analysis.
The respondents had a wealth of experience; they averaged more than 18 years in the
automobile industry and more than 11 years with their company. One advantage of the combined
sample is that it reduces common measure bias; most important, the characteristics of worker
relationships and customer relationships are measured independently of each other, (The customer
relationship variables are also found in the plant manager survey; these yield similar results for
cost reduction as the ones in the marketing director survey.)
A second advantage of the survey is that it asks questions not only about the current year
( 1992) but also about four years previously. Therefore, the dataset has a semi-longitudinal
character. By analyzing determinants of cost reduction between 1988 and 1992 using data which
comes from 1988 or which measures the change from 1988-92, we can alleviate the problem of
reverse causality.
The dependent variable is the average annual percent change in cost between 1988 and
1992 to make the product for which they answered the suney. The respondents were asked not
to adjust the data for inflation. To preserve confidentiality, respondents were asked to answer the
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question within ranges (e.g., did costs fall more than
3°/0, increase 3. 1°/0 to 9°/0.or increase more than 9.1 Y
OOA,between 3.1 and 10YO,plus or minus
~). Data from respondents checking the
box marked ‘don’t know’ was omitted, as were missing values.
Using cost reduction as a performance measure perhaps requires some discussion. First, it
may be that firms with tigh cost reduction are the laggards--those who hadn’t gotten around to
reducing their costs before 1988. In this case, high cost reduction would be a sign of poor (not
superior) performance. Looking at non-cost performance measures, there is little suppo~ for this
view The 21 0/0 of the sample which reduced their costs more than 3°/0 per yea#z had significantly
more new products, and were more likely to produce “just-in-time” (i.e., they produced in smaller
batch sizes, an important ingredient in reducing lead time). There was no significant difference in
number of customer awards received, or in R&D spending as a percent of sales, In addition, firms
which reduced their costs more than 3°/0 per year over the 1988-92 period were more likely to
have reduced their costs by that much between 1991 and 1992. This figure provides evidence that
the top cost reducers were engaged in sustained cost reduction; they hadn’t done all their
trimming in one big lump. On the other hand, firms which had engaged in a systematic
improvement process in 1988 or before had significantly less cost reduction between 1988 and
1992. As discussed below, the explanation for this result could be either that early improvement
efforts focussed on objectives other than cost reduction (such as increasing safety or reducing lead
time), or that to some extent there is only one lump of cost reduction, so if it was taken out in
1988 there was less room for improvement in 1992.
%ven inflation of about 3?40 per year during this period, this translates into a 6V0real
decrease in costs annually.
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IV. LMethods
Combining the insights from the case studies with the data available from the suwey
generates the following hypotheses about the determinants of cost reduction:
O. The determinants of cost reductiotl should be d“ferent forjjrms Itsijlg the trdit[mtd
tnode[ compared tojrms using the voice model of production. To test this hypothesis, I split the
sample according to whether or not firms had data available on suggestions received from
workers in 1988.23 (See chart 1 for variable definitions, and chart 2 for summary statistics. ) The
rationale for this was that if the plant manager didn’t have an idea of how many suggestions had
been received, then worker voice could not have been a particularly important part of the firm’s
operations strategy.’s
The hypotheses investigate the effect of five determinants of the change in average cost
between 1988 and 1992: 1) changes in economies of scale between 1988 and 1992, 2) factor
prices in 1988, 3) voice in 1988, 4) the relationship between cost and quality in 1992, and 5)
technological opportunity for cost reduction over the period 1988-1992.
1,Changes in quantity produced. In the traditional mode!, an increase in quantity proi.iticed itill
lead to a decrease in average cost. Only about 12 million cars and light trucks were produced in
North America in 1992, in comparison with 14 million in 1988 (Automotive News, 1995 p.9).
33See section 6 for the results of using other measures of worker voice to separate the
sample.
‘JThus, many of the firms in the suggestion group had a fairly minimal program. For firms
that had any suggestions, the mean number of suggestions per worker in 1988 was 1,2 ; the
maximum was 11.7. In contrast. auto assembly workers in Japan make an average of 23
suggestions per year. (Pil and MacDuffie, 1995))
~o
Therefore, most firms were producing at well below their peak capacity, making it likely that they
were in the declining portion of their average-cost curves. The measure of quantity is:
CHSALES, the percentage change in the business unit’s sales to the most important
automotive customer between 1988 and 1992.
2. Factor costs
~a [)1[he ~u~itlotlal approach, firms with i)lcreasing factor COStS will hmv Cl~“e~tcrA.
i}wrease i)l average total costs than willjrms which do tmt experience swch increases. Our
measure of this variable is
CUTWAGE, the importance in the firm’s manufacturing strategy in 1988 of efforts to
reduce growth of wages and benefits.
~b. In the Voice approach, firms which pq high relative wages wiii have lower costs, for
efficie}tcy wage ad g~jl-tixchange reasons. This variable is measured using
RELCOMP, the percentage by which total compensation for the firm’s unskilled and
semi-skilled production workers exceeds the average for equivalent workers in all industries in the
plant’s region. 25
Note that the measure of current factor costs differs between the two approaches. The
rationale is that in the voice approach, wages are an important determinant of costly-to-observe
effort, like suggestions. (If a worker doesn’t make a suggestion, it is hard for management to
know if that is because there simply was no way to improve the process, or because the worker
decided not to work that hard.) Receiving higher pay relative to other workers in the area is a
~sThis variable was available only for 1992. However, according to Groshen ( 1991 a and
b), employer wage strategies are quite stable over time.
powerfid incentive to participate. due both to a greater cost of job loss if one is caught shirking.
and to loyalty to the firm. In contrast, the traditional production process is designed not to require
such hard-to-obserwe effort by workers, so the direct effect of compensation on costs out~veighs
the indirect effect of higher relative compensation on worker motivation to reduce costs
2c. kfwmwres which commit mcv]agement to p~it~g workers into the fhture will i}lcrc~t,w
average costs in the traditio}lai modei, and reduce them in the ~~oiccmode!. (lur measures of
commitment to workers are:
NOLAYOFF, a dummy variable measuring whether or not a plant had “made a
commitment to our regular work force that no layoffs will result from productivity increases” in
1988.
3. Voice with customers and workers. in the voice approach, [he use of voice ~t’iillead to
a greater reduction in average cost. [~tthe tradition! approach, voice will have no impac~.
CUSTVOICE is one if the supplier had in 1988 a relationship with its most important automoti~e
customer which was characterized by a) a contract at least two years, b) the supplier provides
detailed information to the customer on its process steps, and c) the customer would help the
supplier match a rival’s price for a product of equal quality. If any one of these three conditions is
not met, then CUSTVOICE is equal to zero.
SUGGEST, the number of suggestions per worker received in 1988.
4. Cost-quality tradeofl, Because of the need to hire technicians to analyze the sources
of defects in the traditiotzd approach, the more the firm increases its quality, the more it will see
its costs increase as we[l. There is tto such tradeoff in the voice approach, because line workers
do [his \vork i~ithe course of their regt~!ar iit{ties. Our measure is:
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USEDATA, which is greater if the firm is more likely to use data regarding sources of
defects in past production to modify its processes.
5. Technological opportunity. Factors which affect the techn~ca[ cot~siraittts utder(tltlg
the production process also affect the success of cost red~ction efforts. Our measures of
technological opportunity are:
IMPROVE, a dummy variable capturing whether or not the plant had gone through a
systematic improvement process (such as the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle) before 1988 If there is
an easily capturable lump of cost reduction that is available to the plant only once, then capturing
it early makes it unavailable later, so the effect of this variable on the change in average costs
between 1988 and 1992 would be positive.
PPRICE, the price of the plant’s typical product (the one for which they answered the
survey). This variable is highly correlated with complexity; both indicate the scope of things which
could be changed to reduce costs, so they should have a negative effect on the change in average
cost.
ALUM, a dummy indicating if the product is made of aluminum or not This variable
captures the impact on cost reduction of using a material which is much less well understood than
steel. the traditional material. It also reflects the impact of a change in the price of raw
aluminum. zs
FORGE, a dummy indicating if the product was forged or not. During this period, a
‘GProducer price indexes for aluminum fell an average of 9.6?40 annually between June
1988 and June 1992; in contrast, they fell only .4’%for steel (which is the material used in 52?A0of
the products made by firms in the sample.) Thanks to Barbara Good of the Federal Resewe Bank
of Cleveland for providing the price information.
~~
technique known as near-net shape forging was diffhsing throughout the industrv; it significantly
reduced costs by allowing the product to be forged in a shape close to its final shape, rather than
the traditional technique of forging a part which is much larger than its final shape, and then
machining it down (Forging Industry Association, 1992).
JAPAN, a dummy indicating if the plant is Japanese-owned or not, This variable captures
two (contradictory) factors. One is that Japanese firms had more experience with the \oice
approach, so they should be able to apply it better, leading to more cost reduction. ~TOn the other
hand, Japanese management wanted to make sure that the product produced in its L’S plants was
exactly the same as that produced in Japanese plants, to reduce complexity and to assure
customers of continuing high quality, Unfortunately, freezing the design meant that the scope for
continuous improvement was much reduced, ~g
V. Results
The model described above was estimated using the “Grouped Data” procedure in
LIMDEP. As table 3 shows, most of the hypotheses are supported. Most important, there is
strong suppoti for the hypothesis that the determinants of cost reduction are different for the
voice and traditional approaches to production.
To show the difference in determinants of change in costs, we can use a form of the
likelihood ratio test (described in Ben-Akiva and Lerman ( 1985, pp.171 -2)) for testing non-nested
“Data from the Japanese sutwey indicates that Japanese suppliers in Japan reduced their
costs between 1988 and 1992 significantly more than did firms located in the United States. See
Helper and Sako ( 1995).
~*Aleading Japanese-owned firm that I visited in 1989 had so constrained itself that all
that its quality circles could work on was improved packaging. For similar examples, see also
Cusumano and Takeishi (199 1).
hypotheses of discrete choice models.z9 The result of this test is that we can reject at the 01 level
the hypothesis that the traditional model explains cost reduction better for the voice approach
than does the voice model. We can also reject at the .01 level the hypothesis that the voice model
explains cost reduction better for the traditional approach.30
Looking at column one of table 3, we see that the voice hypothesis is supported for the
plants with suggestions: close relations with customers leads to a significantly greater reduction in
average costs. Perhaps most surprising to the traditional school is that firms which pay higher
wages relative to their competitors have more cost reduction. 11 Firms with products which are
expensive or made out of aluminum also had more cost reduction. On the other hand, the
hypothesis about long-term commitment to workers was not supported; firms having no-layoff
policies did not have significantly different changes in costs. Also, given that a firm had a
suggestion program in place, having more suggestions did not lead to more cost reduction
Turning to the no-suggestion group (column 2), both the economies of scale and the
quality/cost tradeoff hypothesis are supported. Neither of the factor cost hypotheses are
supported; even in the traditional model, a willingness to lay off employees and cut wages do not
produce greater cost reduction.
29The test was carried out by re-estimating the equations using multinominal Iogit.
30h alternative approach to testing for differences in models would have been to include
interaction terms for those variables which are hypothesized to enter differently into the voice and
traditional models. These interaction terms were not significant.
3]Substituting RELCOMP for CUTWAGE in the traditional model did not produce
significance; neither did putting in CUTWAGE instead of RELCOMP in the voice model. (Thus it
is not the case that high-wage firms cut costs by cutting wages; in fact there is no correlation
(p=.9) between RELCO~ and CUTWAGE.) Labor costs are not a big part of costs for these
firms; for both groups the median is 11%.
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The traditional model fares much worse for the plants with suggestions; the only
significant variables are a subset of the technological opportunity variables (column 3) The sign
on US EDATA becomes negative (though not significant), indicating that these plants do not face
a quality-cost tradeoff. In column 4, we see that none of the variables in the voice model are
significant in explaining change in costs for the no-suggestion group.
For both the suggestion and the non-suggestion groups, having had a formal improvement
process in 1988 or before reduces the amount of cost change. suggesting either that there is a part
of cost reduction that is characterized by a one-time payoff, or that early improvement processes
were not focussed on reducing costs. The Japanese variable is always insignificant.
VI. Discussion
To summarize, the suggestion group achieves cost reduction primarily through
information-rich relationships with customers and workers. In contrast, the no-suggestion group
achieves cost reduction through volume increases, and minimizing attention to quality. That is,
firms which had voice relationships with workers benefited also from voice relationships with
customers. Firms that did not have voice relations with workers achieved no significant cost
reduction due to voice with their customers. Conversely. firms which did not involve their
workers suffered cost increases when they tried to prevent defects from occurring, presumably
because they had to
was able to tap into
hire additional staff to undertake this
the ideas of workers and customers.
task. In contrast, the suggestion group
The mean average annual change in costs for both the suggestion and the non-suggestion
group was the same--about .50/oin nominal terms. At least for the period 1988 and 1992, firms
which had a suggestion program as their only type of voice had no more cost reduction than did
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firms without any voice mechanisms at all. However, fiims which had both a suggestion system
and voice with their customers did significantly better than firms without these mechanisms. These
results are consistent with Milgrom “andRoberts’s (1992) argument that certain production
practices are complementary with each other.32
Given these results, one wonders why not all firms with customer voice and expensive
products did not adopt a suggestion program. Similarly, one would think that customers would
want to adopt voice relationships with all of their suppliers who had suggestion systems in place 33
Aitertmtive interpretations. h alternative interpretation is that the practices chosen by a
firm’s management are dictated by technology, in which case switching to another cost-reduction
regime would not improve that firm’s performance. However, this interpretation is not supported
by the results of several sensitivity tests, First, there was little evidence that the nature of a firm’s
product or process technology affected its observed degree of participation with workers. Firms
with suggestion systems did not differ from those without such systems by their capital-labor
ratio. the nature of the material they used (plastic, rubber, ceramic, aluminum, or steel), or the
3zHowever, effofls to find fkther complementarily within the suggestion group were
unsuccessfid. For example, an interaction term for customer voice and suggestions was not
significant.
33Since the dependent variable is not observed, marginal effects camot be estimated for
the grouped data model (Greene, 1994, p.665). However, for this dataset, the grouped-data
estimates are similar to those obtained via ordina~ least squares. Using the OLS results as a
guide, a firm with the average attributes of the no-suggestion group and a voice relationship with
its customer would have an average increase in cost of 0. So/O per year. If this firm were to adopt a
suggestion system, its predicted annual change in cost would fall by 4.8 percentage points, to
-4, 5%--a substantial decrease.
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nature of their production process (did it involve forging. casting, extrusion, assembly, etc~4) In
cases where two firms listed the same product, they usually had a variety of practices, For
example, of the two firms making fasteners, one had a suggestion system while the other did not
Technology did affect a iirrn’s level of cost reduction in the cases of aluminum and forged
products discussed above, but the inclusion or exclusion of these variables did not affect the core
results. Other aspects of the institutional environment appeared to have [ittle effect on the Ie\el of
cost reduction. Union was never significant: I tried it in regressions without other labor relations
variables, and I tried controlling for the particular union involved (Canadian Auto Workers.
United Rubber Workers, company union, etc.)
The suggestion and non-suggestion groups do vary on a number of important variables.
most of which have to do with mutual dependence between the firm and its workers3S Firms ~rith
suggestion programs are significantly more likely to be Japanese-owned ( 17°/0vs. S?/O);ha~e
lower turnover (4. 7°/0vs. 8?Z0per year); and to “strongly agree” that “Each year we expectour
shop workers to make substantial improvements in their own method of operations”, They iniest
one-third more in formal training of experienced workers(a median of 16 hours per year vs. 12).
Even though the plants are larger ( a median 218 employees vs. 150), the ratio of workers to
supervisors is far higher (21 VS. 16). Surprisingly, the suggestion plants are somewhat /eSS likely
to have voice relations with customers (6 9?6 vs. 10O/O).
34The only exceptions are that stamping firms were more likely to have suggestion systems
than the sample as a whole, and firms whose product was made out of aluminum were less likely
to have labor-management committees.
3SUsing a Kruskal-Wallis test, these differences are significant at the 5°/0level or better.
except for the different in customer voice.
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However, the two groups are similar in terms of nature of production process, price of
product, size of firm (as opposed to size of plant), wage levels, and willingness to make a no-
layoff pledge, As noted above, the two groups are also similar in the average annual change in
costs they report: an increase of O.5?4 per year,
The importance of suggestion ~ystems. A second issue is whether a suggestion program is
the only employee-involvement practice which separates the firms using the two models.
Alternatively, a suggestion system maybe highly co-linear with other variables, MacDuffie ( 1995 j
and Ichniowski, Shaw, and Pennushi (forthcoming; hereafter ISP) found that participative human
resource practices a) tended to be adopted in clusters and b) to have a greater impact on
productivity and quality when they are adopted in clusters. ( lNlacDuffle’s findings were based on a
study of automotive assemblers, while ISP’S came from steel finishing lines. ) To examine these
issues. I constructed measures of each of the seven sets of participato~ human resource practices
used in ISP’S study of complementarily and used each of them separately to split the sample.
Two measures of labor-management communication besides suggestion programs \vere
found to be significant determinants of whether a ‘voice’ or a ‘traditional’ model better explained a
plant’s degree of cost reduction. These were a) management ‘strongly agreed’ that ‘Each year we
expect our shop workers to make substantial improvements in their own method of operations” .
and b) the existence of a labor-management committee which had power over at least one of the
following policies in the plant: work methods and task assignments; changes in product design;
purchasing new tools; safety and health policies; subcontracting work to suppliers; and selecting
supervisors or team leaders.
In each case, the basic results were the same as when the sample was split on the basis of
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the existence ofa suggestion system: the voice model fit the high-participation group better than
did the traditional model; customer voice was a significant determinant of cost reduction only for
those firms with participative human resource policies. and that high relative compensation
enhanced participative firms’ cost reduction efforts. (See tables 4 and 5).
These ‘worker voice’ practices are oflen adopted together. (See table 6 for correlations j
However, they are different in their emphasis. A suggestion program emphasizes individual effort.
which may or may not be the result of a sustained study. A labor-management committee. such as
the one at Industrial Strainer, engages in sustained study of a topic, and attempts to brainstorm
based on members’ diverse knowledge bases. The expectation that a worker will improve her own
practices does not require the worker to write anylhing up or speak in public (significant
advantages to people who may not have done either of these things since leaving school), and
leaves the new technique under the worker’s control; the disadvantage from management’s point
of view is that the knowledge remains unmodified, and that output from different workers may
vary slightly.
Other participative practices studied by ISP were incentive pay; rigorous selection criteria:
employment security; job flexibility; training, and low-conflict labor relations. None of these
factors proved to be significant determinants of which model of cost reduction best applied to a
plant.
I also investigated if adopting additional policies increased cost reduction for a hi-
participation group, by entering them as independent variables into the voice model, AS discussed
above, firms with suggestion programs, worker-generated improvements, and labor-management
committees all had more cost reduction if their relative compensation was higher. [n contrast to
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ISP’S findings, however, neither incentive pay nor job security policies had a significant impact
Having more than one worker voice mechanism also did not improve performance.
There was significant complementarily among the three components of customer voice:
splitting them up changed the results. Having a long-term contract by itself (without the
information provision or customer prodding to remain price competitive) led to a significant
I}lcrea.w in cost in some specifications, whereas providing information by itself was not
significant. These results are consistent with Hirschman’s (1970) view that while some loyalty is
helpful for resolving problems, blind loyalty produces little incentive for action.
Can the models be combined? As discussed above, there is no difference in the average
cost reduction for firms in each of the six worker-voice categories (with and without suggestions,
with and without labor-management committees, with and without worker-generated
improvements). What is to stop a firm from trying to combine the best of both worlds?
Combining the models’ labor relations policies as hypothesized would be difllcult, since the
voice model of cost reduction works best with a no-layoff pledge and high relative compensation
while the traditional model works best with layoffs and with declining wages. However, the
hypothesis about layoffs was not supported.
Seeking economies of scale would not seem to be harrnfhl to a firm with a voice model.
The breakeven point for a product should be lower for a firm with voice than for a firm without
voice, because of the reduced need to hire specialists who cannot be transferred to other work;
this factor should reduce, though not necessarily eliminate, the impact of an increase in a product’s
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sales on average cost. 36The results of adding CHSMES to the voice model provides some
support for this idea, while the coefficient was negative, it was not significant.
VII. Conclusion
This paper has found a number of instances in which policies appear complementary in
pe~formance. Plants which have both worker and customer voice have greater success at cost
reduction than do firms with neither or only one of these practices. Similarly, plants with both
‘worker voice and high wages reduced costs more than firms with neither or only one of these
practices. Firms with all three elements of customer voice performed better than firms with only
one or two, if they also had an employee involvement program.
However, plants do not show much complementarily in their adoption of these practices,
Although there is some correlation among adoption of the three measures of worker voice, there
is no correlation between adoption of worker voice and adoption of a high wage policy, or
between adoption of worker voice and customer voice. There are several possible reasons for this.
firms don’t know about these results, their strategy is effective in improving performance on
measures besides cost, they are prevented by past decisions or other factors horn moving to a new
strategy, or they are worried that changing to a new strategy would reduce their ability to
appropriate rents. 37
3sAt the level of a plant or ajrm, however, fixed costs might rise with a voice approach,
due to the need to make commitments to input suppliers (and due to the ability to make long-term
investments if commitments are received from customers, as in the case of Industrial Strainer’s
CAD purchase. ) However, these resources are flexible across products, so the breakeven for any
one product should not rise with a voice approach.
37The result that firms with worker participation are no more likely to have customer
participation is consistent with that found by Helper and Levine ( 1994), using somewhat different
measures on 1993 data from the plant manager suwey.
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TABLE t. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Dependent Variable
CHCOST
Change in average cost 1988-92 for the “typical” product for which the respondent chose to
answer the survey.
1= costs fell more than 10VO,2= fell between 3.1 and 10OA,3= plus or minus 3?Z0.-l=increase
3, l% to 9!40.5= increase more than 9. l%
Independent Variables
CHSALES
Change in sales to most important customer. 1988-92.
1 = decrease more than 30°/0, 2 = decrease 15-30°/0, 3 = decrease 6- 14°/0,4=+/-50A,
5= increase 6- 15Y0,6= increase 15-30’?lo,and 7=increase more than 30?/o.
CUTWAGE
Importance to the business unit’s manufacturing strategy of reducing growth of wages and
benefits, 1988
1 to 5 scale, where 1= Less important, 5=Extremely important
RELCOMP
Percentage by which pay of unskilled and semiskilled production workers exceeds that for
equivalent workers in all industries in the plant’s geographic area, 1992
NOLAY
= 1 if management has made a commitment to the regular work force tha no layoffs will result
from productivity increases, 1988
=0 otherwise
SUGGEST
number of suggestions per production worker, 1988
CUSTVOICE
= 1 if all of the following are true:
a) a contract with most important automotive customer of at least two years, b) the supplier
provides detailed information to the customer on its process steps, and c) the customer would
help the supplier match a rival’s price for a product of equal quality
=0 otherwise
USEDATA
1 to 5 scale. 1= Strongly agree, 5= Strongly disagree “We rarely use data regarding sources of
defects in past production to modifi past processes.
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IMPROVE
=1 if plant had completed formal improvement process by 1988,
=0 otherwise.
PPRICE
Price of the product, 1992
ALUM
= 1 if product is made of aluminum;
=0 otherwise
FORGE
=1 if product is forged:
=0 othenvise
JAPAN
=1 if firm is Japanese owned;
= O otherwise
LM POWER
O to 6 scale, where one point is awarded for each of the following policies in the plant over which
the labor-management committee has influence: work methods and task assignments: changes in
product design; purchasing new tools; safety and health policies; subcontracting work to
suppliers; and selecting supervisors or team leaders
= O if there is no labor-management committee
.Ymnple Separation Variables
SUGGESTION PROGRAM = 1 if the plant had a suggestion program in place in 1988;
= O otherwise.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE= 1 if the firm had a labor management committe
which influenced at least one of the policies in LM POWER;
=0 otherwise.
WORKER-GENElU4TED IMPROVEMENT= 1 if management ‘strongly agrees’ that ‘Each year
we expect our shop workers to make substantial improvements in their own method of operation;
= O 0 therwise.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
A. Plants \t Ithout suggestions
~ariabk Label K Jlean Std Dev \ [munum Maximum
.-—-. __.—— —— ----------- ...___ ----------------------
CHCOST
CUSVOICE
SUGGEST
CHSALES
USEDATA
NOLAY
RELCOMY
CLJTWAGE
IMPROVE
PRICE
ALU!vl
FORGE
JAPAN
---------------
Change inaverage cost, 88-92 89 00030899 00533402 -0.1500000 0 1-!00000
Voice relations w/customer,88 89 0.1011236 03032005 0 I ()()()()(/(.)[1
Suggestions per worker, 1988 89 0 0 0 0
“/Ochangesales to customer,88-92 89 15.6460674 17 1330360 -35.0000000” Sjoo(j(l(j({]”
Rarely use det’ect data,92 89 4.2696629 1.0418956 10000000 5(:IO(J(NNl{1
No layoffs due to productlv1y,92 89 0.2359551 0.-1269999 0
Pay relative to \workers m area,92
1 (NO(IIIO()
89 00435393 0 1162120 .05000000 [):[)(j(’loo(l”
importanceoislowingwa~e~owth.t18 89 ?,9775281 09290456 1.0000000 j (J(JOOO~I(’I
Engaged in improvement process. 88 89 0.3146067 04669900 0 I I)(JII(J(K](I
Product price. 1992 89 185730337 303914378 0.5000000 150 f:100(JOO”I
Product made of aluminum 89 0.0224719 0.1490522 I) 1 0000OW
Product is forged 89 00337079 0.1814987 0 1 OOOOO(J(]
Owned by Japanese tirm 89 0.0898876 0.2876412 0 I 000006
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------. .
B. Plants wth suggestions
Variable Label N Mean Std Dev Minimum Ma\]mum
.-------------.--.-------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHCOST Change maveragecost.88-92 86 0.0075000 0.0572700 -0.1500000 0 I400(’0{)
CUSVOICE Voice relations wlcustomer,88 86 00697674 02562489 0 ] O()()(j(!()ll
SUGGEST Suggestions per worker,88 86 12453057 1.8173402 00176533 I 167-2152
CHSALES ?Lochangesales tocustomer 86 1-11860465 17.7707702 -350000000 35000(_~O(J0
USEDATA Rarely usedefectdata,92 86 4.3720930 0.9080880 2.000000050000000
NOLAY No lay-offsdue to productivity,92 86 0.2093023 04091966 0 10000000
RELCOMP Payrelative toworkersinarea.92 86 00576163 0.1048212 -0.1500000 () 3000( :}00”
CUTWAGE Importance ofslowing w’agegro\\th,88 86 3.2093023 0.9470236 1.00000005.Oooow)
MPR(.)VEEngaged in Improvement process,92 86 0.44[8605 0.4995210 0 I Oocmm)
PRICE Product price 86 26 1686047 36.8842076 05000000 150000 (’I(I(I(J
ALUM Product madeofalurninum S6 00232558 01515989 0 1 (jo(j(l)l)(’1
FORGE Product is forged S6 00116279 01078328 0 1 000()~~01)
JAPAFJ OwmedbyJapanesei-m 86 01744186 03816947 I) [ oo(J()(](’l(j
-----------. ------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 3. TWO MODELS OF COST REDUCTION.
SEPARATION VARIABLE. EXISTENCE OF SUGGESTION PRO-GRAM
YOICEMO13E~.
PLANTS WITH
SUGGESTION
PROGRAM
TRADITIONAL MOOEL
PLANTS WITHOUT
SUGGESTION
PROGRAM
TRADITIONAL MODEL VOICE MODEL
PLANTS WITH PLANTS WITHOUT
SUGGESTION SUGGESTION
PROGRAM PROGRAM
VARIABLE
CONSTANT
CHSALES
CUSTVOICE
SUGGEST
CUTWAGE
RELCOMP
NO LAYOFF
USEDATA
iMPROVE
PPRICE
ALUM
FORGE
JAPAN
COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT
14587”
(0.85283)
-2.1324
(2.5817)
0.46851
-048862
(3.5926) (O 78717)
0.08857””
(0.3040)
-0.02737
(0.03123)
-4617y*
(2.0714)
-074491
(1 8390)
-0.27298
(-030171)
-0.47281
(0.54427)
0.57808
(0.60503)
-11 17W”
(5.0650)
-0.77774
(4.7220)
1.2089
(1 3937)
1,0052
(1 .4422)
0.89877
(1.5034)
10244
(15280)
0.95764””
[.49036]
-0.26840
(0.63859)
2.757P””
(1 0646)
13583
(1 2996)
1.3351
(1 2150)
18643”
(1.1051)
-0.0261 “
(.0144)
-0.0276
(0.0189)
-0.0351””
(-0.01 55)
0.0300
(00199)
-7.8280””
(3.6794)
4.8018
(3,5407)
-8.1735””
(3.8983)
-5.0640
(3.6484)
-4.7527
(3.0513)
1.1885
(5.0473)
-5.5441 ““
(2.9188)
3.3911
(5,3394)
0.16636
(1 5647)
1.1511
(2.1482)
0.0716
(1.4%6)
1.5558
(-2.0529)
LOG L
‘J
-95.7
85
-94.9 -100.2 -98.5
8688 85
NOTES TO TABLE 3:
1. STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES.
2. “-. O5>P> 10
3. ‘“- 05>p> Cll
4. ““”-.01 >P
TABLE 4. TWO MODELS OF COST REDUCTION
SEPARATED BY EXISTENCE OF IABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
VOICE MODEL
PLANTS WITH
LABOR-MGMT
COMM\TTEE
TRADITIONAL MODEL
PLANTS WITHOUT
LA50R.MGMT
COMMITTEE
TRADITIONAL MODEL VOICE MODEL
PLANTS WITH PLANTS WITHOUT
LA BOR-MGMT LABOR-MGMT
COMMITTEE COMMITTEE
VARIABL~
CONSTANT
CHSALES
CUSTVOICE
LMPWR
CUTWAGE
RELCOMP
NOLAYOFF
lJSECATA
IMPROVE
PPRICE
ALUM
FORGE
JAPAN
COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT
-0.10191
(1 ,2528)
-4.5140
(2,8623)
-11880
-0.21455
(3.0479) (o 79954)
-0.040306
(0.030859)
-0.029501
(0.34643)
-3.5583”.
(1 .8406)
-0.75478
(2.1491)
0.62330
(0.41820)
0.52588
(0.52619)
0.14737
(0.6531 8)
-4.0702
(5.0156)
-lo.13w
(4.7319)
-0.44135
(0.77842)
0.83161
(1.3849)
0.012128
(1.3140)
-0.58315
(1.6148)
070368
(0.54328)
0.47749
(0.55295)
2.9585”””
(10313)
1.5845
(1 .2535)
2.0683””
(1 .0305)
17449
(1 2844)
-0.052870”””
(0.01 7367)
0.027198”
(0016531)
-0.045368”””
(0,017461)
0.03042Y
(0.016114)
-3.2826
(3.5092)
-10.19V*”
(3.9458)
-3.5080
(3.5753)
-6.970r
(3.8247)
-5.5246
(3.7076)
3.0009
(3.4546)
4,7847
(3.6065)
-2.5436
(3.6189)
3.5509””
-1.7464
-0.93658
(1 .6075)
3.54-W
(1 .9177)
-C.79621
(1 6400)
-104.5 -66.2 -1079
94 77 94
NOTES TO i74BLE 4
1. STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES
2. “-. O5>P>1O
3. ““-. E> P>.O1
4. ..”-01 >P
-879
77
LOG L
N
TABLE 5. lWO MODELS OF COST REDUCTION
separation VARIABLE: EXPECTATION OF HIGH WORKER ~MpROVEMENTS
VOICE MODFI
PLANTS WITH
Hl WORKER
IMPROVEMENTS
TRADITIONAL MOOE~
PLANTS WITHOUT
H/ WORKER
IMPROVEMENTS
TRADITIONAL MODEL VOICE MODEL
PIANTS WITH PLANTS WITHOUT
HI WORKER HI WORKER
IMPROVEMENTS IMPROVEMENTS
VARIABLE
CONSTANT
CHSALES
CUSTVOICE
‘ CUTWAGE
RELCOMP
NOL4YOFF
USEDATA
IMPROVE
PPRICE
ALUM#
FORGE
JAPAN
LOG L
N
COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT
2.730
(,80315)***
-2.7994
(2.5794)
4.4777
-0.19480
(3.9881) (069081 )
-0.050601“
(0.026685)
0.0349
(o 0395)
-6. 3006*W
(1 8693)
-040578
(1.7015)
0.14701
(0.48542)
-12214
(.78101)
-15.095***
(4.4584)
0.89955
(1.2258)
-5.6802
(4 2580)
0,81418
(1 .3032)
0.53128
(1.5659)
0.10600
(1 3210)
-0.5290
(0.58484)
0.62663
(0.50935)
-1,2209
(1.1328)
00040
(,01159)
2.9956”””
(0.99174)
-3.4472*”’
(1.3927)
3.81 55*””
(1 .0008)
-0.022811
(0.018369)
-0.00859
(0.01400)
-0.027062
(0.01 8569)
-6.35058”
(2.7789)
-5.6995””
(2.7860)
3.9481
(3.7420)
-0.38927
(1.7213)
4.7183
(3.0952)
6.7260
(4.4497)
-3.9671
(3.1385)
1.9027
(1 ,5529)
-0.37775
(-0193)
2.0239
(1 .5664)
-33.5 -150.6 -41.7 -152.3
12843 128 43
NOTES TO TABLE 5
1. STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES.
2. “-.O5>P>.1O
3. ““-. O5>P>.O1
4. ““.-.01 BP
#5. NO FIRMS MAKING ALUMINUM PRODUCTS HAD HIGH EXPECTATIONS OF WORKER
IMPROVEMENTS
Table 6. Correlation Analysis
Simple Statistics
Variable N Mean Std Dev sum Minimum Maximum Label
POSSUG 171 0.49708 0.50146 85.00000 0 1.00000
existence of suggestion program, 1988
HILM 171 0.54971 0.49898 94.00000 0 1.00000
existence of labor-management committee
HIXPC 171 0.25146 0.43513 43.00000 0 1.00000
worker-generated improvements
Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > IRI under Ho: Rho.o / N = 171
POSSUG HILM HIXPC
POSSUG
existence of suggestion program, 1988
1.00000
0.0
HILM
existence of labor-management committee
0.19453
0.0108
HIXPC
worker-generated improvements
0.20558
0.0070
0.19453
0.0108
1.00000
0.0
0.03692
0.6317
0.20558
0.0070
0.036~
0.6317
1.00000
0.0
